Braithwaite R. B., Russell Bertrand, Waismann Friedrich. The Relevance of Psychology to Logic: A Symposium. Aristotelian Society. Verifiability · F. Waismann. In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Journal of The Principle of Lazerowitz – – Mind 46 () Friedrich Waismann. Verifiability (Part II of a symposium). Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume XIX (), pp. – – Volume
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Science Logic and Mathematics. The Relevance of Psychology to Logic. It has some affinities with pragmatism and operationalism, but it differs from them in some important respects. Pragmatism, as presented by C. In its later formulations it is presented simply as a criterion for determining whether a sentence is cognitively or factually meaningful.
Problems Raised by the Principle. Reprinted in Logical Positivismedited by A. Barnes – – Philosophy 14 In order to meet these difficulties, sentences, statements, and propositions may be distinguished in the following way: Lloyd – – Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 42 1: From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University’s proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy.
Because each style has its own formatting nuances that evolve over time and not vrrifiability information is available for every reference entry or article, Encyclopedia. Bridgman and others, is the view waismannn the meaning of a term is simply the set of operations that must be performed in order to apply the term in a given instance. Carnap is largely concerned in these articles with giving a technical account of the formal features of such languages.
F. Waismann, Verifiability – PhilPapers
The verifiability principle stands historically in a line of direct descent from the empiricism of David HumeJ. Similarly, Hempel, in his article “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning”discussed the proposal that a sentence has cognitive meaning if and only if it is translatable into an empiricist language.
Finally, as we noted before, there is also the problem of explaining what is meant by saying that a basic observation statement is verifiable in principle, that is, that certain experiences are logically possible, if in fact the experiences in question never occur. To meet objections of this kind Ayer introduces a number of conditions; he says 1 “a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an observation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone,” and 2 “a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: It has also been thought to be of importance for the criterion of weak verifiability or confirmability, for, it has been said, unless basic statements are certain, or in some sense incorrigible, no other statement can be even probable or confirmable.
A formulation of this kind was given by Ayer in the first edition of Language, Truth and Logic Cambridge University Press, This, apparently, would be a psychological claim, to the effect that we are capable of types of experience other than those we usually associate with the normal functioning of our sense organs. And Wittgenstein, in the Tractatussaid explicitly, “To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.
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It might be argued that a congenitally blind person could be said to understand the sentence “This is red” if he were able to identify red objects in some other way, by touch, for example. Baylis – saismann Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 3: However, Schlick’s distinction between content and form cannot friedricn his view from the objection of solipsism; for if the meaning of every descriptive expression is to be found, in the last analysis, in private experience, then this is so not only for qualitative words but also for the relational words that are supposed to describe the saismann of experience.
Consequently, in still other formulations the principle is presented as applying directly to sentences; the objection to this is that sentences are not normally said to be true or false, and hence they are not said to be verifiable or falsifiable.
Retrieved December 28, from Encyclopedia. Waismann logical positivists with the wajsmann of Neurath, Carnap, and others, who at one time adopted a “coherence theory” of truth held this view on the grounds that there are only two ways in which the truth-value of a statement can be ascertained, either a priori or a posteriori.
As Hempel explains, dispositional terms may be introduced by means of “reduction sentences,” and the theoretical constructs of the more advanced sciences for example, “electrical field,” “absolute temperature,” “gravitational potential” can be accommodated by allowing the language to include interpreted deductive systems.
The question whether a statement reporting an empirical observation is conclusively verifiable is, as we have seen, of importance for the criterion of conclusive verifiability and for that of conclusive falsifiability. A principle that expresses a linguistic recommendation is no doubt closely related to a corresponding analytic statement, but the recommendation itself is not tautological and uninformative.
The philosopher in friiedrich may eventually admit that the relevant states of the world are, friefrich all, experienceable — but intuitively or by some other special kind of experience.
In order to understand the status of the verifiability principle, in the form in which it was held by the logical positivists, the following considerations are relevant: To meet these objections some other early formulations of the principle identified the meaning of a statement with that of some finite conjunction of statements directly reporting empirical observations.
All of these exclude metaphysical statements as being meaningless. In either case, it is objected, the principle cannot be the decisive criterion of cognitive meaning that its adherents suppose it to be. Sign in Create an account. The conditions are, however, insufficient for this purpose. The fourth criterion is the most liberal and admits into the class of meaningful statements empirical statements of the various kinds that were excluded by the requirement of conclusive verifiability or the requirement of conclusive falsifiability.
A statement which cannot be verified conclusively is not verifiable at all; it is just devoid of any meaning. It was sometimes suggested that conclusive falsifiability rather than conclusive verifiability should be the veifiability of a cognitively meaningful statement. History of Western Criedrich. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 9 Baylis – – Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 3: Burns and Oates, A recommendation or a decision has a different logical status; it is not successful by being true or unsuccessful by being false.
If the sentences in question express statements, the use of the predicates that occur in them must be governed by semantic rules; how can these rules be known or explained to anyone else if the states of affairs which the sentences are supposed to describe verifizbility not experienceable in any way at all?
It is concerned with the fact that one component of the verifiability principle is the thesis that the meaning of a statement is given by its truth conditions. Verifiability in Flew, A. Sign in to use this feature. Bernard Gert – – Friedricg Studies 16 3: No keywords specified fix it.